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Aholelei-Aonga: Affirmative Action

SUMMARY

ELDREDGE V. CARPENTERS' 46 NORTHERN
CALIFORINA COUNTIES JOINT
APPRENTICESHIP TRAINING COMMITTEE:
THE NINTH CIRCUIT FINALLY HAMMERS
THE CARPENTERS' UNION WITH AN
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PLAN

I. INTRODUCTION

In Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 Northern California Counties
Joint Apprenticeship Training Committee,l the Ninth Circuit·
held that affirmative action2 was the proper remedy for de-

1. Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. Cal. Counties Joint Apprenticeship Training
Committee, 94 F.3d 1366 (9th Cir. 1996) (per Fletcher, J., joined by Reinhardt, J.,
and Kozinski, J.) ("Eldredge VI").
2. The United States Department of Labor Guidelines define "afUrmative
action" as:
Affirmative action is not mere passive nondiscrimination.
It includes procedures, methods, and programs for the
identification, positive recruitment, training, and motivation of present and potential minority and female (minority and nonminority) apprentices utilizing the establishment of goals and timetables. It is action which will
equalize opportunity in apprenticeship as to allow full
utilization of the work potential of minorities and women.
The overall result to be sought is equal opportunity for
all individuals participating in or seeking entrance to the
Nation's labor force.
29 C.F.R. § 30.4(b) (1996). See David B. Oppenheimer, Understanding Affirmative
Action, 23 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 921, 926 (1996). Afflrmative action refers to
"race- and gender-conscious practices[.]" [d.
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cades3 of Title VII violations by the Carpenters 46 Northern
California Counties Joint Apprenticeship Training Committee
(hereinafter "the JATC").4 The court found that a plan which
increased opportunities for women was necessary to dissipate
the adverse effects of a selection process which had had a disparate impact on female applicants to the JATC's carpentry
apprenticeship program. 5 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit instructed the district court to enjoin the JATC's further use of
the so-called "hunting license"s system, discounting the JATC's
arguments that the system was a business necessity. 7 The
court pointed out that the JATC's own numerical referral list
system was available as an alternative, less discriminatory,
practice. s The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court
had abused its discretion in adopting a remedy which had
simply eliminated the "first-job requirement" for female applicants. 9 The court found that such a remedy was both unlawful
and inadequate since it could not rectify the JATC's past discrimination and had denied female applicants the skills necessary for success in the carpentry trade. 10

3. The affirmative action plan is the result of 21 years of litigation between
the parties. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1367. Plaintiff Linda Eldredge filed her lawsuit against the JATC in September of 1975 in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California. Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. Cal. Counties JATC, 440 F. Supp. 506, 509 (N.D. Cal. 1977) ("Eldredge I"). The case has
gone through two appeals and subsequent remands. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1367.
The Plaintiff Class noticed its third appeal to the Ninth Circuit in 1993.
Appellants' Opening Brief at 6, Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. Cal. Counties
JATC, 94 F.3d 1366 (9th Cir. 1996) (93-16925). The Ninth Circuit issued its decision in September of 1996, 21 years after Plaintiff Linda Eldredge had filed her
gender discrimination case. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1366-67. See discussion infra
part II.B.
4. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1371.
5. Id.
6. A "hunting license" is a slang term for the letter of subscription issued by
the JATC to its apprenticeship program applicants. The hunting license allowed
the applicant to seek employment on his or her own. Eldredge I, 440 F. Supp. at
512.
7. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1370.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1369.
10. Id.
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II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Over the past two decades, a number of women have applied for admission to the JATC apprenticeship program but
have found it difficult to meet the so-called "first-job requirement."ll Previously, the Ninth Circuit had found that this
inability to gain admission was due to the discriminatory procedures used by the JATC to select its apprentices. 12 Despite
extensive litigation, however, the number of female applicants
admitted to the program has remained relatively low in comparison to male applicants. 13
A. THE JATC CARPENTRY APPRENTICESHIP

PROGRAM

The JATC is a joint-labor-management committee created
by a 1963 collective bargaining agreement (hereinafter the
"Trust Agreement") between various Northern California carpentry contractors' associations 14 and local unions of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (commonly known as the "AFL-CIO").15 The Trust Agreement required the JATC's Board of Trustees 16 to establish a carpen-

11. Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. Cal. Counties JATC, 94 F.3d 1366, 1368
(9th Cir. 1996) ("Eldredge VI").
12. [d.
13. [d. at 1367. In August 1996, there were 191 female apprentices in the
JATC's program. Appellee's Petition for Rehearing at Exh. 3, Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. Cal. Counties JATC, 94 F.3d 1366 (9th Cir. 1996) (93-16925). See
discussion infra part lILA.
14. Signatory employer associations included the Building Industry Association
of Northern California, the Sacramento Building Industry Association, the Engineering & Grading Contractors Association, the California Contractors Council,
Inc., the Associated General Contractors of California, and the Bay Counties Area
General Contractors Association. Appellee's Brief at i, Eldredge v. Carpenters 46
No. Cal. Counties JATC, 662 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1981) (No. 79-4482), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 917 (1982).
15. Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. Cal. Counties JATC, 440 F. Supp 506, 510
(N.D. Cal. 1977) ("Eldredge I").
16. The fourteen members of the Board of Trustees are selected as follows: the
Carpenters 46 Northern California Counties' Conference Board appoints seven
members, the Associated General Contractors of California (hereinafter "AGC")
appoints three members, the Northern California Home Builders Conference (hereinafter "NCHBC") appoints three members, and the AGC and the NCHBC appoint
one member at-large. Appellee's Brief at 5, Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. Cal.
Counties JATC, 662 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1981) (No. 79-4482), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
917 (1982).
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try apprentice training program in the various Northern California counties. 17 To fulfill its obligation, the JATC established a four-year carpentry apprenticeship program which
allowed participants to attain journeyman status 18 after completing a classroom training program and gaining some on-thejob experience. 19 The development and coordination of the
classroom instruction program to supplement the requisite job
experience was the JATC's central focus. 2o To qualify for admission to the apprenticeship program, applicants had to meet
minimal age and education requirements and had to find a
"first job" in the carpentry trade. 21
Applicants could satisfy the first-job requirement by utilizing either one or both of the following authorized means: (1) a
numerical referral list system22 and (2) a hunting license sys-

17. Eldredge I, 440 F. Supp at 510. The Trust Agreement provides, in part,
with respect to the JATC's duties:
The Board of Trustees shall have the power and duty to
administer the Fund, to establish, support or maintain
Programs, and payout the assets of the Fund for the
purpose of educating and training persons as journeymen
or apprentices in all classifications covered by any Collective Bargaining Agreement, to the end that there shall
be an adequate supply of educated and skilled journeymen
available to man the jobs of Individual Employers.
Appellee's Brief at 5, Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. Cal. Counties JATC, 662 F.2d
534 (9th Cir. 1981) (No. 79-4482), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 917 (1982). The Trust
Agreement also states that the various parties are to be bound by the JATC's
construction of the agreement. Brief of Appellants at 5, Eldredge v. Carpenters 46
No. Cal. Counties JATC, 662 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1981) (No. 79-4482), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 917 (1982).
18. A journeyman is defined as: "A workman who is thoroughly qualified in a
trade, having passed through an Apprenticeship, and who earns the prevailing
standard wage for the trade." ILLUSTRATED DICTIONARY OF BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION TERMS 225 (1976) (Emphasis in original).
19. Eldredge I, 440 F. Supp at 510-11.
20. Appellee's Brief at 6, Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. Cal. Counties JATC,
662 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1981) (No. 79-4482), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 917 (1982). The
four year program required apprentices to undergo 576 hours of classroom instruction and 6,200 hours of on-the-job experience. Id.
21. Eldredge I, 440 F. Supp. at 511. The applicants had to be at least 17
years old and have either a high school diploma or a general education diploma.
Id.
22. Placement on the numerical referral list was accomplished by submitting
an application to the local JATC office and receiving, in turn, an applicant number. The order of placement was determined according to the order applications
were received. Appellants' Opening Brief at 9, Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. Cal.
Counties JATC, 94 F.3d 1366 (9th Cir. 1996) (No. 93-16925).
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tem. 23 Under the numerical referral list system, an applicant
would simply await job referrals from the local JATC office
distributed according to the applicant's ranking on a numerical
referral list of applicants,24 whereas under the hunting license
system, the applicant was required to seek his or her own
employment independently. 25
Upon meeting the first-job requirement, the applicant was
allowed to sign an indenture agreement with the local JATC
office. 26 This indenture agreement also allowed the applicant
to apply for membership with his or her local carpenters' union. 27 After executing the indenture agreement, the applicant
became an indentured apprentice and was eligible to enter the
classroom training program. 28
B. ELDREDGE'S ALLEGATIONS OF DISCRIMINATION

Linda Eldredge brought this suit on behalf of all female
applicants to the JATC program who had been denied admission because of the JATC's hunting license system. 29 Eldredge
first became aware of a potential problem when she applied to
the JATC's carpentry apprenticeship program in August of
1975.30 Although Eldredge had waited outside the San Francisco JATC office hours ahead of time hoping to obtain a high

23. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1368.
24. Id. In this instance, the employer would call the union dispatcher to request an unspecified beginning apprentice. The union dispatcher would then contact the JATC and the JATC would dispatch the applicant ranked highest on the
numerical referral list. Eldredge I, 440 F. Supp at 512.
25. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1368. Typically, the applicant would seek employment from potential employers, by presenting his or her hunting license. If the
contractor decided to hire that applicant as a beginning apprentice for at least
sixty days, the contractor would sign the hunting license which the applicant returned to the local JATC office. The employer would then contact the union dispatcher and request that applicant by name. Eldredge I, 440 F. Supp at 512.
26. Eldredge I, 440 F. Supp at 511.
27. Id. Even if the indentured apprentice should happen to lose his or her job
only one day after signing the indenture agreement, his or her indenture status
would remain intact. Appellants' Brief at 5-6, Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. Cal.
Counties JATC, 833 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1987) (No. 85-2846), cert. denied, 487 U.S.
1210 (1988).
28. Eldredge I, 440 F. Supp at 511.
29. Id. at 510 n.l.
30. Id. at 512.
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placement on the JATC numerical referral list, she was yet
unable to gain admission because of alleged discriminatory
practices. 31 She had been under the impression that the JATC
numerical referral list system was an easier way of fulfilling
the first-job requirement than the hunting license system since
"it did not require a new applicant to [already] have connections in the trade.,,32 In reality, however, employers had only
intermittently used the numerical referral list system, instead
relying almost entirely upon the hunting license system. 33
Although Eldredge had received her hunting license and
had been given a place on the numerical referral list, initially
she had believed that the JATC had discriminated against her
and other female applicants because she had been denied
equal placement on the referrallist. 34 Consequently, Eldredge
filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter "EEOC") charging the JATC with gender
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act (hereinafter "Title VII,,).35
In support of her claim, Eldredge alleged two specific instances of gender discrimination. 36 First, she contended that,
because she was a woman, the Apprenticeship Coordinator for
the San Francisco JATC office had evaded answering her questions regarding placement on the numerical referral list and
the process for receiving subsequent referrals. 37 Second, she

31.
32.
JATC,
(1982).
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 512-13.
Appellants' Brief at 7-8 n.2, Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. Cal. Counties
662 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1981) (No. 79-4482), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 917

Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1370.
Eldredge I, 440 F. Supp at 512-13.
Id. at 513. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act provides as follows:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or
retraining, including on-the-job training programs to discriminate against any individual because of his race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin in admission to, or employment in, any program established to provide apprenticeship or other training.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) (1995).
36. Eldredge I, 440 F. Supp at 513.
37. Id.
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asserted that a JATC official had given a woman who had been
first in line at the San Francisco JATC office the number two
appointment Slip38 instead of the number one appointment
Slip.39 Although the JATC official had later corrected the mistake at the woman's request, the official had also required the
woman to sign on a long strip of tape placed over the number
one spot. 40
One month later, Eldredge requested and received a
"right-to-sue" letter from the EEOC. 41 She immediately filed
suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California alleging that her experience at the JATC's
San Francisco office had constituted gender discrimination!2
Initially, the district court had dismissed the action for nonjoinder of indispensable parties,43 reasoning that the individu-

38. An "appointment slip" is synonymous with an "applicant number." See
supra note 22.
39. Eldredge I, 440 F. Supp at 513.
40. Id.
41. Id. Upon receipt of Eldredge's complaint, the EEOC initially referred
Eldredge to the California Fair Employment Practice Commission (hereinafter
"FEPC") recommending the issuance of a preliminary injunction against the JATC.
The FEPC declined to process the charges, however, and sent the case back to the
EEOC. The EEOC then issued Eldredge a right-to-sue letter stating that it was
unable to "investigate, conciliate or file suit" within the 180 day period required
by statute. Id.
Because Title VII prohibits an aggrieved party from suing an employer
without the permission of the EEOC, a person must first obtain a "right-to-sue"
letter from the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(O(1) (1995). A "right-to-sue" letter is a
written authorization by the EEOC that allows the complainant to commence a
legal action against an employer. The EEOC will issue such a letter under any
one of the following circumstances: (1) if the EEOC finds it does not have jurisdiction or other administrative reasons; (2) if the Plaintiff requests the letter before
the administrative process is complete, and the EEOC, in its discretion, decides to
issue the letter; (3) if the EEOC finds that there is no reasonable cause; or (4) if
the EEOC finds that there is reasonable cause and no conciliation has been
reached, and the EEOC has determined that it will not itself bring suit. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1601.28 (1996).
42. Eldredge I, 440 F. Supp. at 513. During the pendency of her legal action,
Eldredge awaited job referrals from the JATC but had not attempted to use her
hunting license to find a job on her own. After receiving information from the
JATC that a large number of applicants had found their own jobs, however,
Eldredge tried unsuccessfully to do the same. Consequently, Eldredge amended her
complaint to allege that the JATC's hunting license system had had a disparate
impact on female applicants. Id. at 514.
43. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rule 19 allows a court to dismiss an
action for failure to join a party if
(1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be ac-
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al employers were indispensable parties that must be joined
and that Eldredge had failed to comply with its earlier order to
join the employers." The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that the absent employers' interests would not be
impaired since the employers had ceded their interests in the
apprenticeship program selection process to the JATC. 45 The
court reasoned that interested employers could intervene if
they so desired. 46
On remand, Eldredge requested the district court to certify
a class which included all female applicants who had unsuccessfully applied to the JATC's program (hereinafter "the
Plaintiff Class").47 Although the court certified the class, the
court also granted summary judgment in the JATC's favor
holding that the JATC could not be liable for the employers'
discrimination as a matter of law. 48 Again, the Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court's decision, holding that the JATC's
hunting license system had had a disparate impact on female
applicants to the program and therefore was a prima facie
violation of Title VII. 49 In reaching its decision, the court reviewed statistical data which showed that a much smaller
percentage of female applicants had been admitted to the pro-

corded among those already parties, or (2) the person
claims an interest relating to the subject of the action
and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the
person's absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or
impede the person's ability to protect that interest or (ii)
leave any of the persons already parties subject to substantial risks of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise
inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest.
FED. R. CN. P. 19.
44. Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. Cal. Counties JATC, 83 F.R.D. 136 (N.D.
Cal. 1979).
45. Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. Cal. Counties JATC, 662 F.2d 534 (9th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 917 (1982) ("Eldredge II"). See supra note 17.
46. [d.

47. Appellants' Opening Brief at 2, Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. Cal. Counties JATC, 833 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1987) (No. 85-2846), cert. denied, 487 U.S.
1210 (1988).
48. Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. Cal. Counties JATC, 51 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 149, 151 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
49. Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. Cal. Counties JATC, 833 F.2d 1334 (9th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210 (1988) ("Eldredge IV"). Because the JATC
had failed to show that the system was a business necessity, the court determined
that the Plaintiff Class was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. [d.
at 1341.
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gram than male applicants. 50 The Ninth Circuit instructed the
district court to enter summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff Class and to hold a trial to determine the appropriate remedy.51 Unfortunately for the Plaintiff Class, the district court
adopted a remedy which simply exempted women from the
first-job requirement and did not impose any affirmative obligation on the JATC to admit women to the program. 52 The
Plaintiff Class again appealed the district court's ruling to the
Ninth Circuit.53 This time, the appellate court not only reversed the court below but also issued an opinion which instructed the district court to adopt an affirmative action plan,
to appoint a monitor to oversee its implementation, and to
enjoin the further use of the hunting license system. 54 This
third appellate decision is the subject of this article.
III. BACKGROUND
Women who have entered the carpentry trade and other
male-dominated occupations have encountered discrimination
from employers and labor unions. 55 Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act creates a statutory framework which prohibits em50. Id. at 1339.
51. Id. at 1341.
52. Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. Cal. Counties JATC, No. C-75-2062-JPV
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 1993) (order granting injunctive relieO ("Eldredge V"). The
Plaintiff Class proposed (1) that the JATC eliminate the hunting license system
and require the use of only the numerical referral list system; (2) an affirmative
action plan that mandated the referral of one woman for every four men sent to
job referrals from the numerical referral list; (3) the appointment of a monitor to
oversee the implementation of the affirmative action plan; and (4) other specific
relief to increase the success rate of women in the carpentry trade. Id. In contrast, the JATC proposed a two-track system in which female applicants no longer
needed to meet the first-job requirement while male applicants were still required
to secure employment prior to admission into the program. Thus, female applicants
would be allowed to enter the JATC program without a confirmed job offer. Under
this proposal, the JATC sought to avoid the complete elimination of the hunting
license system. Id. Shortly after trial and before the issuance of the court's order,
the JATC informed the court that it had unilaterally implemented its proposal.
Appellants' Opening Brief at 5, Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. Cal. Counties
JATC, 94 F.3d 1366 (9th Cir. 1996) (93-16925).
53. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1367.
54. Id. at 1369-72 .
. 55. See JOB TRAINING FOR WOMEN: THE PROMISE AND LIMITS OF PuBLIC POLICIES 265-87 (Sharon L. Harlan and Ronnie J. Steinberg eds., 1989) (hereinafter
"JOB TRAINING FOR WOMEN") for a discussion of the inequities that prevent women
from obtaining nontraditional employment.
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ployer practices that either classify or have a discriminatory
effect on certain protected groups, including those based on
gender, race, religion, color or national origin. 56 Title VII also
provides a basis for evaluating and remedying certain discriminatory employment practices. 57 Once employment discrimination is shown, Title VII provides for such remedies as injunctions, back pay, reinstatement, attorney's fees and other relief
which the district court may deem appropriate. 58

A. WOMEN IN THE CARPENTRY TRADE
Traditionally, the carpentry trade, as with most construction industry jobs, has been closed to women. 59 This is apparent in the number of women actually employed in the trade. 60
In 1975, female carpenters comprised only 10 percent of carpenters nationwide. 61 A decade later, about another 8,700 female carpenters had entered the trade, increasing the percentage of women to about 12 percent. 62 By 1995, female carpenters still accounted for only 12 percent even though an additional 8,000 women had entered the trade. 63 The most recent
figures available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics show that
in November 1996 women accounted for only 11 percent of all
carpenters despite the infiltration of the trade by another
2,000 women. 54 Thus, although the number of women enter56. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1995).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, et seq. (1995).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (1995).
59. MARy L. WALSHOK, BWE-COLLAR WOMEN: PIONEERS ON THE MALE FRONTIER 5 (1981); JOB TRAINING FOR WOMEN, supra note 55, at 269.
60. See U.S. Dept. of Labor, Nat'l Employment, Hours, and Earnings, Bureau
of Labor Statistics, <http://stats.bls.gov/cgi-binldsrv>. The number of women admitted to apprenticeship programs has also remained low. JOB TRAINING FOR WOMEN,
supra note 55, at 277. In July 1968, the U.S. Bureau of Apprenticeship and Training reported that out of 77,151 total construction apprentices nationwide, there
were only two female apprentices; three years later, there were only five. [d. That
number increased to 3,198 by 1975 and again to 13,279 in 1979. [d. at 278 tbl.
1~~
.
61. See U.S. Dept. of Labor, Nat'l Employment, Hours, and Earnings, Bureau
of Labor Statistics, <http://stats.bls.gov/cgi-binldsrv>. There were a total of 102,500
carpenters nationwide; 10,300 women and 92,200 men. [d.
62. See id. Carpenters nationwide totaled 154,700; male carpenters numbered
135,700 and female carpenters, 19,900. [d.
63. See id. In 1995, there was 225,000 carpenters nationwide; 195,700 men
and 27,300 women. [d.
64. See U.S. Dept. of Labor, Nat'l Employment, Hours, and Earnings, Bureau
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ing the carpentry trade has more than tripled over the past
two decades, their overall percentages still pale in comparison
to the men's numbers. 65
Contrary to the general trend in the trade, the actual
number of women in the JATC's carpentry apprenticeship
program has remained relatively low. 66 Between 1975 and
1984, while approximately 39 percent of male applicants had
gained admission to the program, less than 21 percent of female applicants had also entered the program. 67 This resulted
in women constituting less than 3 percent of the JATC's program participants. 68 Similarly, between 1985 and 1990, more
than 56 percent of all male applicants were admitted to the
JATC's program, as compared with less than 23 percent of
female applicants. 69 Again, women accounted for less than 3
percent of the JATC's apprentices between 1985 and 1990. 70
According to the most recent figure available, in August 1996
the number of women in the JATC's program had decreased to
191.71 Thus, the actual number of women in the JATC's program has steadily decreased in the past two decades. 72
Despite the s~ow movement of women into the carpentry
trade and other "nontraditional,,73 occupations, women contin-

of Labor Statistics, <http://stats.bls.gov/cgi-binldsrv>. There were 227,900 male
carpenters and 29,600 female carpenters, totaling 257,500 carpenters nationwide.
Id.
65. See id.
66. Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. Cal. Counties JATC, 94 F.2d 1366, 1368·
(9th Cir. 1996) ("Eldredge VI").
67. Appellants' Opening Brief at 10 n.8, Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. Cal.
Counties JATC, 94 F.3d 1366 (9th Cir. 1996) (No. 93-16925).
68. See id. There had been 54,344 male applicants and 3,140 female applicants
to the program between 1975 and 1984. The actual number of women admitted
during this time period was 657. Id.
69. Id. at 11. A total of 1,333 women had applied to the program in addition
to 19,655 men. Id. Note that the Ninth Circuit incorrectly stated the percentage of
men admitted as 48 percent, however, that number should be 56 percent. Id.
70. See id. at 10. 306 women had successfully gained admission during this
five year period, 1985-1990. Id.
71. Appellee's Petition for Rehearing at Exh. 3, Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No.
Cal. Counties JATC, 94 F.3d 1366 (9th Cir. 1996) (No. 93-16925). At the same
time, male apprentices numbered 2,308. Id.
72. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1368.
73. "Nontraditional" jobs generally refer to fields or occupations traditionally
held by men, such as plumber, carpenter, electrician and bricklayer. See JOB
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ue to seek such jobs for two main reasons. 74 First, these jobs
generally offer reasonable wages and benefits due to the high
level of skill required. 75 Second, many women find working in
traditionally male occupations both rewarding and well-suited
to their talents. 76 However, gender discrimination in the form
of employer practices remains a barrier for the women who
desire to make carpentry, or other nontraditional jobs, their
chosen occupation. 77
B. GENDER DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196478 is one of the
main statutory bases for remedying gender discrimination in
employment. 79 Specifically, Title VII prohibits discriminatory
acts, policies or practices by an employer against any person or
group based on race, sex, color, national origin, or religion. 80

TRAINING FOR WOMEN, supra note 55, at 265.
74. See Sylvia A. Law, "Girls Can't Be Plumbers"-Affirmative Action for Women in Construction: Beyond Goals and Quotas, 24 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. fu:'!. 45, 48
(1989).
75. Law, supra note 74, at 48. Professor Law sunnises that most women enter
the construction field because it pays more than female-dominated jobs such as
secretarial work. 1d. The following example illustrates this point. In 1992, a carpenter earned a median weekly income of approximately $425 per week, while
female-dominated jobs such as secretary and hair dresser paid much less: $373 per
week and $260 per week, respectively. Kathleen Green, Should You Build a Future as a Construction Tradeswoman?, 37.ocCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK QUARTERLY 2, 5
(1993).
76. Law, supra note 74, at 48-49; Green, supra note 75, at 3.
77. JOB TRAINING FOR WOMEN, supra note 55, at 270, 286. See Green, supra
note 75, at 7.
78. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (1995).
79. BARBARA LINDEMANN SCHLEI AND PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 1 (2d. ed., 1983).
80. Title VII provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classifY his employees or
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as
an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
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Title VII applies to private employers with fifteen or more
employees, public and private education institutions, labor
organizations, and federal, state and local agencies. sl
Under Title VII, a plaintiff may have two theories of liability upon which he or she may proceed against an employer. s2
First, a plaintiff may allege intentional disparate treatment by
an employer. s3 In this instance, the employer intentionally
mistreats the employee because of the employee's gender, or
other protected classification. s4 The second theory, disparate
impact, occurs when an employer practice adversely impacts a
protected groUp.85
Briefly, both theories of liability have essentially the same
framework, with the exception of a showing of discriminatory
intent in disparate treatment cases. 86 In alleging disparate
treatment, the plaintiff must initially make out a prima facie
case. 87 The burden then shifts to the employer to show a legitimate or nondiscriminatory purpose for its actions. 88 If the
employer meets this burden, the plaintiff must then show that
the proffered legitimate reason is only a pretext for discrimination.89
Similarly, in cases alleging disparate impact, the plaintiff
must also establish a prima facie case of discrimination. 90 Unreligion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1995).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1995).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), (k) (1995). "[Title VII] proscribes not only overt
discrimination but also [employment] practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (holding
that company's facially neutral employment requirements disparately impacted
African-American workers).
83. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335
n.15 (1977) ("Teamsters") (holding that intentional discrimination by the union in
treating minority workers less favorably than whites violated Title VII).
84. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.
85. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
86. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.
87. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1972) (holding that
a plaintiff in a disparate treatment case may rebut an employer's proffered legitimate reason by proving that it is but a pretext for intentional discrimination).
88. [d. at 802.
89. [d. at 804.
90. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1976) (holding that neutral
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like disparate treatment cases, however, the plaintiff need not
prove discriminatory intent. 91 Instead, the plaintiff is required
to prove only that an employer practice adversely affected a
protected classification. 92 The burden then shifts to the employer to justify the practice or policy as a business necessity.93 Business necessity means only that an employer practice
has a "manifest relationship to the employment in question,,94
or is "necessary to safe and efficient job performance.,,95 If the
employer successfully meets the business necessity burden,
then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the
employer's interests may still be met by an alternative practice
that would not have such an adverse effect.96 In either case, if
the plaintiff prevails, he or she is entitled to the remedies
provided by Title VIL 97
C. COURT-ORDERED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PLANS AS REMEDIES
FOR TITLE VII VIOLATIONS
Title VII provides explicit remedial measures which the
courts may impose on the employer in the event of proven
violations. 98 Courts have further interpreted Title VII to grant
district courts broad discretion in constructing the most comprehensive relief possible. 99 Thus, a wide range of relief is

height and weight requirements are valid as bona fide occupational qualifications
despite having had a disparate impact on female applicants).
91. [d. at 328.
92. [d. at 329. Title VII requires the removal of arbitrary and unnecessary
barriers that operate to discriminate against a protected class. Griggs, 401 U.S. at
431.
93. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329.
94. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
95. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 331 n.14.
96. [d. at 329.
97. See 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-5(g) (1995).
98. Title VII provides:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally
engaged . . . in an unlawful employment practice . . . ,
the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in
such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include,
but it is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without backpay . . . , or any other equitable
relief as the court deems appropriate.
42 u.s.c. § 2000e-5(g)(l) (1995).
99. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 364; Equal Employment Oppt'y Comm'n v. Ford,
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available to plaintiffs under Title VII, which may include reinstatement, back pay, attorney's fees, injunctions or affirmative
action plans. loo The courts have held that injunctive relief
may be appropriate where the discriminatory employer practice was not justified as a business necessity.lol However, according to the United States Supreme Court, the issuance of
affirmative action as a remedy requires, among other things, a
finding of pervasive and long-standing discrimination by the
employer. 102
The Supreme Court initially reviewed the appropriateness
of affirmative action as a Title VII remedy in Local 28 of Sheet
Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC (hereinafter "Sheet Metal
Workers").103 The Court upheld the Sheet Metal Workers plan
which had established a numerical goal of 25 percent for minority union membership and had appointed a monitor to ensure the defendant unions' conformance with the plan. 104 The
Court reasoned that the plan was necessary,105 flexible, 106
645 F.2d 183, 200 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding that consideration by the district court
of other remedies to which plaintiff may have been entitled was necessary).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1995).
101. Cox v. Chicago, 868 F.2d 217, 221 n.2 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that injunction against a discriminatory practice not justified by a business necessity should
apply to all potentially affected parties); Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 565
F.2d 895, 899 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that district court properly enjoined discriminatory employment practice not justified by a business necessity); Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290, 1298-99 (8th Cir. 1975) (holding that district
court should enjoin employer practice found to have disparate impact on AfricanAmericans); Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870, 879 (6th Cir. 1973)
(holding that discriminatory practice must be enjoined if it is not justified by a
business necessity). See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433 (1971).
102. Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. Equal Employment Oppt'y
Comm'n, 478 U.S. 421, 448-49 (1986) (holding that affirmative action is the proper
remedy for an employer's egregious and pervasive discrimination in violation of
Title VII).
103. 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
104. Id. at 433. The affirmative action plan, as originally adopted by the district court,
required [the unions] to offer annual, nondiscriminatory
journeyman and apprentice examinations, select members
according to a white-nonwhite ratio to be negotiated by
the parties, conduct extensive recruitment and publicity
campaigns aimed at minorities, secure the administrator's
consent before issuing temporary work permits, and maintain detailed membership records, including separate records for whites and nonwhites.
Id. at 432-33.
105. Initially, the Court noted that both lower courts had found affirmative
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temporaryl07 and it did not impair the interests of white
workers. lOS In addition, the Supreme Court determined that
the Sheet Metal Workers plan met the defendant unions' constitutional challenge because it survived strict scrutiny; the plan
was narrowly tailored to promote the compelling government
interest of remedy past discrimination. 109
Similarly, in United States v. Paradise,110 the Supreme
Court addressed the constitutionality of a court-ordered affirmative action plan. l1l The Paradise plan mandated the Alabama Department of Public Safety to promote one MricanAmerican trooper for every white trooper promoted until the
percentage of Mrican-American troopers reached 25 percent. 112 In determining the validity of the plan, the Court articulated four factors similar to those used in Sheet Metal
Workers: 113 (1) the plan's necessity and the effectiveness of
other remedies,114 (2) its flexibility and duration,115 (3) the

action necessary to cure the defendants' "pervasive and egregious discrimination."
Id. at 476. Second, the Court stated that the district court had twice found the
defendants in contempt for failing to comply with various parts of its remedial
orders. Id. at 477. Moreover, as the district court had determined, the defendant
union's reputation for discrimination dissuaded minorities from applying for union
membership, thus an injunction would have been ineffective. Therefore, the Court
concluded that affirmative action was necessary. Id.
106. The Court reasoned that the plan's flexibility was evidenced by the district
court having twice granted deadline extensions and continually allowing for various
changes to the membership goal. Id. at 478. More importantly, the Court found
that the district court had constructed the plan as a means of ensuring the
defendants' compliance with its orders rather than as a "strict racial quota." Id.
107. The numerical requirement that 25 percent of the union membership be
minority workers terminated once that goal was reached, thus the Court determined that the plan was temporary in nature. Id. at 479.
108. Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 479.
109. Id. at 479-81.
110. 480 U.S. 149 (1986). The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People initiated the action against the Alabama Department of Public Safety
because African-Americans were excluded from the state troopers. Id. at 154.
111. Id. at 153.
112. Id. The district court had issued the plan after eleven years of departmental non-complian.::e with court orders. The district court had previously ordered
the state to refrain from utilizing discriminatory practices against African-Americans and to establish a non-discriminatory promotion procedure. Id. at 154-55.
113. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
114. The Court noted that the district court had ordered the affirmative action
plan to further three goals: First, to dissipate Alabama's discrimination against
African-Americans; second, to ensure the state's compliance with the plan and
third, to eliminate the effects of the state's prior delays. Paradise, 480 U.S. at
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numerical goal's relation to the pertinent labor market, 116
and (4) the burden such a goal may have on the rights of third
parties. 117 The Supreme Court upheld the Paradise plan, concluding that it not only met the above factors, but that it was
also narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government purpose and therefore constitutional. 118
Recently, the Supreme Court evaluated the constitutionality of federally imposed affirmative action plans in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena. 119 The Adarand petitioner challenged the constitutionality of federal set-aside provisions that
are present in most federal contracts giving prime contractors
a monetary incentive to hire subcontractors who had been
certified socially or economically disadvantaged. 120 Without
reviewing the merits of the case, the Court held that affirmative action plans or programs imposed by any government
actor, federal, state, or local, must be narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling governmental interest in order to survive a
constitutional challenge. 121 Presently, therefore, all affirmative action plans imposed by the government must meet the
Adarand standard. 122

171-72.
115. The Court found that the plan was flexible because it could be waived if
there were no qualified African-Americans available and it was only applicable at
the time promotions were made. In addition, the plan was temporary because it
terminated once the state came up with a new promotion procedure that did not
adversely impact African-American troopers. [d. at 177-78.
116. The Court determined that since minority workers constituted 25 percent
of the relevant labor force, the court-ordered 25 percent numerical goal properly
reflected that figure. [d. at 179. Moreover, the Court noted that the district court
had appropriately ordered this one-for-one requirement in light of the state's past
conduct in failing to comply with the court's orders. [d. at 180-81.
117. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171. The Court found that the one-for-one requirement did not burden white workers because it was used only at the corporal rank
and it did not require the termination of any white workers. Although the plan
may have denied some white workers future employment, the Court held this was
not· a substantial burden. [d. at 182-83.
118. [d. at 167.
119. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
120. [d. at 2102. For a brief discussion of the federal set-aside provisions at
issue in Adarand, see David B. Oppenheimer, Understanding Affirmative Action,
23 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 921, 944 (1996).
121. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2113.
122. [d. Professor Oppenheimer suggests that post-Adarand affirmative action
plans must be remedial, flexible, waivable, temporary, and not burden the interests of white employees in order to meet the Adarand standard. Oppenheimer,
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IV. COURT'S ANALYSIS
In Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 Northern California Counties
JATC, the Ninth Circuit reviewed a district court's Title VII
remedial order for abuse of discretion. 123 The order had established a gender-based selection system to the JATC's carpentry
apprenticeship program. 124 The court reversed the district
court's ruling, holding that the court below had abused its
discretion in adopting a remedy which was not only unlawful,
but also insufficient to remedy the JATC's past discrimination
against female applicants. 125 Instead, the Circuit instructed
the district court to adopt an affirmative action plan designed
to repair the JATC's long-standing and systemic discrimination, after determining that the plan was permissible. 126
A. THE DISTRICT COURT'S PRESCRIBED REMEDY WAS NEITHER
NECESSARY NOR NARROWLY TAILORED TO REMEDY THE JATC's
PAST DISCRIMINATION

The Ninth Circuit first considered whether the district
court had erred in adopting a two-track system that imposed
separate gender-based standards on apprenticeship program
applicants. 127 The two-track system had allowed female applicants to enter the JATC's program without fulfilling the firstjob requirement, while male applicants were still required to
obtain initial employment in the trade prior to admission. 128
The Ninth Circuit noted that pursuant to Sheet Metal Workers,129 Title VII remedies, at a minimum, must be narrowly
tailored to remedy past discrimination. 130
In determining the necessity of the two-track system, the
supra note 120, at 946 (1996).
123. Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. Cal. Counties JATC, 94 F.3d 1366 (9th Cir.
1996) ("Eldredge VI").
124. Id. at 1369.
125. Id. at 1372.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1369.
128. Eldredge VI, 94 F.2d at 1369.
129. Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. Equal Employment Oppt'y
Comm'n, 478 U.S. 421 (1986). See discussion supra part III.C.
130. Id.
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court reviewed an opinion it had issued in a prior appeal. 131
The court emphasized that it had clearly articulated that the
principal problem with the JATC's admission process was the
hunting license system because of the disparate impact it had
on female applicants. 132 Therefore, the most reasonable solution, the court, noted would be to eliminate the hunting license
system and to utilize the gender-neutral system that was already in place: the numerical referral list system. 133 Thus, in
the court's opinion, the adoption of the JATC's "mutilated version" of the hunting license system was unnecessary. 134
Furthermore, the court found that the JATC's proposed
system was not narrowly tailored to remedy past discrimination by the JATC. 135 The court reasoned that, in fact, the
JATC's plan worsened the situation for women in two
ways.13G First, the plan denied female applicants on-the-job
experience, the most important tool for their success in the
carpentry trade.137 Second, the plan discouraged the JATC
from actively recruiting and selecting female applicants because a major portion of the JATC's funding came froni employer contributions made according to the hours worked by
the JATC apprentices. 13S Therefore, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the plan did not meet the minimal requirements of
Sheet Metal Workers because it was neither necessary nor
narrowly tailored to rectify the JATC's past discrimination. 139

131. Id. The court reviewed its opinion issued in Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No.
Cal. Counties JATC, 833 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210
(1988) ("Eldredge IV").
132. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1369. In Eldredge N, the Ninth Circuit found that
the hunting license system had had a disparate impact on female applicants and
remanded the case for entry of summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff Class
based on the JATC's use of the system. Eldredge N, 833 F.2d at 1341.
133. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1369.
134. Id. at 1369.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. The Plaintiff Class alleged that the plan adopted by the district court
had, in fact, disadvantaged female applicants by not providing them with the legitimacy that the hunting license communicates to potential employers. The Plaintiff
Class claimed that the hunting license impliedly certified that its holder has been
deemed qualified by the JATC. Appellants' Opening Brief at 24, n.28, Eldredge v.
Carpenters 46 No. Cal. Counties JATC, 94 F.3d 1366 (9th Cir. 1996) (No. 93·
16925).
138. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1369.
139. Id.
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More importantly, the court found that the plan was "unlawful,
inadequate and contrary" to the principles it had set forth in
its prior opinion. 14O The Ninth Circuit held, therefore, that
the district court had abused its discretion in adopting the
JATC's proposal. 141

B. THE

DISTRICT COURT HAD ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
REFUSING TO ADOPT AN ALTERNATIVE PLAN PROPOSED BY THE
PLAINTIFF CLASS

The Ninth Circuit next determined the validity of the
remedies proposed by the Plaintiff Class, including an affirmative action plan. 142 The court reviewed the three major components of the proposal submitted by the Plaintiff Class to
determine whether the district court had abused its discretion
in refusing to adopt it instead of the JATC's two-track system. l43 Subsequent to its review, the court concluded that the
district court had erred in not requiring, among other things,
an affirmative action plan to dissipate the effects of discrimination.l44
1. The District Court Had Abused Its Discretion in Refusing to
Enjoin Use of the Hunting License System and in Refusing to
Order Use of the Numerical Referral List System
The Ninth Circuit held that the district court had erred in
refusing to enjoin further use of the hunting license system
since this system had been the primary cause of the disparate
impact against women. l45 Again referring to its earlier opinion, the court noted that it could not have been "more explicit"
in pointing out the disparities caused by this system. l46 Thus,
the court held that elimination of the hunting license system

140. Id. at 1367. Again, the court was referring to its opinion in Eldredge N,
discussed supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
141. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1369.
142. Id. at 1369-72.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1369-72.
145. Id. at 1369.
146. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1370. The court was again referring to its earlier
decision in Eldredge N. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
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was required because the JATC had not shown that the system
was justified by a business necessity.147 .
Next, the court considered whether the district court
should have ordered the JATC to use only the numerical referral list system in assigning all applicants to their first job. l4B
The Ninth Circuit noted that the district was both authorized
and obligated to issue an order that would eliminate the effects
of past discrimination and prevent discrimination in the future. 149 The issue before the court, therefore, was whether it
was within the discretionary authority of the district court to
order the JATC to use only the numerical referral list system. 1SO
In addressing this issue, the Ninth Circuit emphasized the
gender-neutral nature of the numerical referral list system,
noting that job referrals are made according to the applicant's
rank on the list rather than according to gender. 151 Moreover,
the court found that the numerical referral list system allowed
female applicants to compete on equal footing with male applicants because employers would no longer be able to pick only
male applicants as had been the case under the hunting license system. 152
The Ninth Circuit also addressed the JATC's contention
that the limitations on employers' discretion in the selection of
its apprentices would result in employers refraining from re-

147. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1370.
148. Id. The district court had characterized the adoption of the numerical
referral list system without the hunting license system as a completely new procedure that would impinge on the employers' discretion to hire its own apprentices.
The district court had also stated that formulation of a remedy to facilitate female
applicants' admission to the JATC's program should not create havoc for 4,500
potential employers and 60 unions. Order Granting Injunctive Relief at 11,
Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. Cal. Counties JATC, No. C-75-2062-JPV (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 9, 1993).
149. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1370. The court stated that to remedy a Title VII
violation the district court "has not merely the power but the duty to render a
decree which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past
as well as bar like discrimination in the future." Id. (quoting Albemarle Paper Co.
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975)).
150. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1370.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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questing JATC apprentices. 153 The court responded that the
numerical referral list system had been used intermittently by
employers without objection during the score of years that it
had existed. 154 Despite the JATC's assertion that the numerical referral list system would burden employers, JATC's own
board member admitted that he had never spoken with an
employer who had hired an apprentice through the numerical
referral list system. 155 The court stated that employers would
still have the option of not employing an apprentice for any
legitimate reason. 156 Moreover, the court noted that there
was an economic incentive for employers to use the JATC's
beginning apprentices since they are paid substantially less
than journeymen carpenters.157 The court concluded that the
district court had abused its discretion in failing to order the
JATC to use only the numerical referral list system in its apprenticeship program. 158
2. Adoption of Aflirmative Action Would Remedy Past
Discrimination·
The Ninth Circuit determined that the district court had
abused its discretion in refusing to adopt the affirmative action
plan proposed by the Plaintiff Class. 159 The affirmative action
plan set a twenty percent admission rate for female applicants
which would terminate once female apprentices constitute
twenty percent of all apprentices in the JATC's program. 160
Referring to Sheet Metal Workers, the court stated that an
affirmative action plan may be "appropriate where an employer or labor union has engaged in persistent or egregious discrimination, or where necessary to dissipate the lingering ef-

153. Id. The district court had stated that use of the numerical referral list
system would deprive employers of any discretion in choosing their own employees
and it presupposed that employers would call in blind for untrained and inexperienced apprentices. Order Granting Injunctive Relief at 11, Eldredge v. Carpenters
46 No. Cal. Counties JATC, No. C-75-2062-JPV (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 1993.
154. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1370.
155. Id.
156. Id.
·157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1370-72.
160. Id. at 1370.
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fects of pervasive discrimination."161 Similarly, with reference
to Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,162 the Ninth Circuit
noted that federal courts may require remedial affirmative
action plans where an employer's conduct has been "pervasive,
systematic, and obstinate."I63
The court then reviewed the JATC's conduct over the
course of the litigation. l64 Initially, noting that the JATC's
reliance on the hunting license system had effectively excluded
women from the carpentry trade during the life of the case, the
court was not surprised that women accounted for only five
percent of the JATC's applicant pool.165 The court found that
female applicants had consistently represented less than three
percent of all applicants admitted and that male applicants
had had a significant advantage over female applicants. 166
Thus, the court concluded that the JATC's conduct had been
both obstinate and egregious. because the JATC had, in the
court's opinion, continued its legal battle to preserve the status
quo. 167
Next, the court examined the appropriateness of the affirmative action plan under the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in United States v. Paradise. l68 Under Paradise,
a court-ordered affirmative action plan must be analyzed under
four factors: its necessity and the efficacy of alternative remedies, its flexibility and temporary nature, including waiver
provisions, the propriety of the numerical goal's relationship to
the relevant labor market, and the its incidental burden on the

161. Id. (quoting Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 445).
162. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). See discussion
supra part III.C.
163. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1370 (quoting Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. Specifically, the court stated, "[t]he bottom line is that women historically have been systematically excluded from carpentry work and for more than
two decades have sought relief through the courts while the JATC, the craft's
gatekeeping organization, has waged a relentless battle to preserve the status
quo." Id.
168. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1370. The court referred to the Supreme Court's
opinion in United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) discussed supra part
III.C.
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rights of third parties. 169
To determine the necessity of the affirmative action plan,
the court reviewed the JATC's past conduct. 17o Citing to statistics as well as the JATC's own failure to facilitate female
applicants' admission into the apprenticeship program, the
court concluded that the plan was necessary to remedy the
JATC's past discrimination against women.17l In so concluding, the Ninth Circuit characterized the JATC's conduct as
recalcitrant foot-dragging. 172
The court then considered whether the proposed plan was
flexible and temporary as required by Sheet Metal Workers. 173
First, the court noted that the plan terminated on its own
terms once women comprised twenty percent of the program's
indentured apprentices. 174 Second, the court stated that the
JATC need only make reasonable efforts to recruit more female
applicants should the JATC's present applicant pool prove
insufficient to satisfy the numerical goal. 175 More importantly, the court noted that the numerical goal met the Sheet Metal
Workers standard because it only set a benchmark against
which the court could gauge the JATC's efforts. 176
In addition, the Ninth Circuit questioned whether there
was a proper nexus between the numerical goal and the carpentry labor market. 177 Referring to the guidelines issued by
the United States Department of Labor,178 the court found

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
grams,

Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1371.
Id. at 1371-72.
Id. at 1372.
Id.
Id. at 1371.
Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1372.
Id.
Id.
Id.
With respect to equal opportunities in apprenticeship and training prothe United States Dept. of Labor Guidelines provides:
[I]n order to deal fairly with program sponsors, and with
women who are entitled to protection under the goals and
timetables requirements, during the first 12 months after
the effective date of these regulations, the program sponsor would generally be expected to set a goal for women
for the entering year class at a rate which is not less
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that the numerical goal proposed by the Plaintiff Class was
proper since it was a conservative estimate. 179 Thereafter, the
court determined that the numerical goal would not unduly
burden male applicants ·Cas third parties) since both male and
female applicants still had to meet minimal admission requirements. 180 So, qualified men would not be passed over for unqualified women. l8l Moreover, the numerical goal did not require the expulsion of any male apprentices already in the
program, although it may delay the admittance of potential
male apprentices. 182 The court concluded that the affirmative
action plan, with its numerical goal, was permissible and held
that the district court had abused its discretion in refusing to
adopt it. 183
3. Egregious and Obstinate Conduct Necessitated a Courtappointed Monitor
The Ninth Circuit briefly addressed the district court's
refusal to appoint a monitor.l84 The court alluded to the
JATC's persistence in refusing to facilitate the admission of
women to its apprenticeship program, specifically, that
throughout the litigation, the JATC had done everything in its
power to exclude women from the program. l85 Under the circumstances, the court concluded that a monitor was necessary
and the district court had abused its discretion in declining to
appoint one. 186

than 50 percent of the proportion women are of the
workforce in the program sponsor's labor market area and
set a percentage goal for women in each class beyond the
entering class which is not less than the participation
rate of women currently in the preceding class.
29 C.F.R. § 30.4(0 (1996).
179. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1372.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1372.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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CONCLUSION

In Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 No. Cal. Counties JATC, the
Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's adoption of a genderbased remedy as illegal and insufficient to remedy the JATC's
past discrimination against women. 187 The court held that
the proper remedy in the case of long-standing and egregious
discrimination was an affirmative action plan to encourage and
expedite the admission of women into the JATC's apprenticeship program. l88 In addition, the court determined that elimination of the discriminatory practice was reqUired since it was
not necessary to job performance. 189 Moreover, the court determined that a court-appointed monitor was necessary to
administer the plan and ensure the JATC's compliance. 19o In
so doing, the Ninth Circuit issued a ruling which endorsed a
gender-conscious selection process amidst growing opposition
to affirmative action plans 191 and pounded what may be the
last nail into over two decades of litigation between the parties.

Unaloto-ki-Vahanoa Halamehi Aholelei-Aonga·

187. Id.
188. Id. at 1369-72.
189. Eldredge VI, 94 F.3d at 1370.
190. Id. at 1372.
191. See Rinat Fried, Preference Plan Carved Out for Union's Hiring, THE RECORDER, Sept. 10, 1996, at 1.
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